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“I’LL SEE”: HOW SURVEILLANCE UNDERMINES
PRIVACY BY ERODING TRUST
Robert H. Sloan† and Richard Warner††
Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog argue persuasively that
“modern privacy law is incomplete because from its inception it has
failed to account for the importance of trust.” We address the open
question of how privacy law should “account for the importance of
trust.” We combine the focus on trust with another theme: the
dehumanizing effect of surveillance. As the security expert Bruce
Schneier notes, “psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, novelists,
and technologists have all written about the effects of constant
surveillance. . . . It threatens our very selves as individuals. It’s a
dehumanizing tactic employed in prisons and detention camps.” We
address the open question of why (and under what conditions) it does
so. The link between the loss of trust and the dehumanizing effects of
surveillance not only makes a compelling case that privacy law
should preserve trust and prevent dehumanization, but also suggests
how it can do so.
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INTRODUCTION
In Shakespeare’s Othello, Iago manipulates Othello into
worrying that his wife, Desdemona, may be unfaithful. In response,
Othello declares,
I’ll see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove;
And on the proof, there is no more but this,
—Away at once with love or jealousy!

1

Othello’s plan is to suspend judgment until he collects enough data to
“see” whether Desdemona is faithful. The irony is that his “I’ll see”
changes what he sees. Before, Desdemona was his “soul’s joy,”2 and
he trusted her to be faithful. His “I’ll see” suspends that trust and
leads him to brush aside her professions of love as lies. In addition,
and importantly for our purposes, the “I’ll see” destroys Desdemona’s
trust in Othello.3
1.
3, sc. 3.
2.
3.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO (Stephen Orgel & Russ Mcdonald eds., 2001), act
Id. at act 2, sc. 1.
See, e.g., Shakespeare, supra note 1, act 4, sc. 2, where Desdemona remarks,
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Contemporary surveillance has the same “I’ll see” plan as
Othello. Or, better a similar plan. The analogy is far from perfect.
Othello both conducts the surveillance and interacts with Desdemona
as husband and wife. Businesses and governments are nonetheless
importantly like Othello: they collect data to see what people are like
in order to treat them accordingly.4 We are concerned with the effects
on individuals who, like Desdemona, do not conduct that surveillance
themselves.5 The Othello analogy, while imperfect, is still enough on
point to sharply pose the question of whether surveillance undermines
trust among individuals who live their lives under a pervasive
investigative gaze.
The question is as neglected as it is important. As Neil Richards
and Woodrow Hartzog persuasively argue, “modern privacy law is
incomplete because from its inception it has failed to account for the
importance of trust.”6 We combine our consideration of trust with
another urgent concern: the threat pervasive surveillance poses to the
self. As many have argued, “To the extent we risk the loss of privacy
we risk, in a very real sense, the loss of our very status as subjective,
autonomous persons.”7

I have none [no husband]. Do not talk to me, Emilia.
I cannot weep, nor answers have I none
But what should go by water [be expressed in tears].
4. JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL: HOW WE ARE SACRIFICING A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE 14 (2007). Rule notes that modern
surveillance practices share a distinctive and sociologically crucial quality: “they not only
collect and record details of personal information; they are also organized to provide bases for
action toward the people concerned.” (emphasis in original) Systematically harvested personal
information, in other words, furnishes bases for institutions to determine what treatment to mete
out to each individual. Id.
5. We note in passing that, in contemporary surveillance, the watcher is indeed also
often the watched. As Jeffery Rosen notes, “[t]he sociologist Thomas Mathiesen has contrasted
Michel Foucault’s Panopticon—a surveillance house in which the few watched the many—with
what he calls the “Synopticon” created by modern television, in which the many watch the few.
But in the age of the Internet, we are experiencing something that might be called the
“Omnipticon,” in which the many are watching the many, even though no one knows precisely
who is watching or being watched at any given time.” JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD:
RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 11 (2005). We focus however on
business and government surveillance in which the people surveilled are not also conducting the
surveillance.
6. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, ___
STANF. TECH. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2017).
7. Michael P. Lynch, PRIVACY AND THE THREAT TO THE SELF THE N.Y. TIMES (June
22, 2013), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/privacy-and-the-threat-to-the-self/.
See also BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 127 (2015). The connection between privacy and the self is
a standard theme in the privacy literature. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
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The link among trust, surveillance, and the self is the concept of
privacy in public.8 This concept dates back at least to the nineteenth
century sociologist Georg Simmel, who observed that people
voluntarily limit their knowledge of each other as they interact in a
wide variety of roles.9 Thus, certain information remains private
relative to the interaction even if it is readily publicly available to
others in other contexts. The link to the self lies in the fact that
[a]t its core, managing privacy is about managing relationships
between the self and others. . . privacy [is] a “boundary regulatory
process by which a person (or group) makes himself more or less
accessible and open to others.” When we regulate our accessibility
to others—including the accessibility of information, objects,
space, time, or anything else that we deem private—we
10
simultaneously regulate our relationships with them.

We argue that adequate self-realization requires adequately
“managing relationships between the self and others.” That is possible
only when people can trust each other to voluntarily limit their
knowledge of each other. Surveillance, we contend, erodes trust
thereby undermining privacy in public and consequently limiting
possibilities for self-realization. This framework allows us to make a
compelling case for privacy law to intervene to preserve privacy and
protect the self, and it also allows us to suggest how the law can do
so.
Section I characterizes the ubiquitous “I’ll see” of contemporary
surveillance. A key point is that the data collected typically fails to
adequately represent the values, purposes, and intentions of the

PRIVACY 112 (2008) (“Theorists have proclaimed the value of privacy to be protecting intimacy,
friendship, individuality, human relationships, autonomy, freedom, self-development, creativity,
independence, imagination, counterculture, eccentricity, thought, democracy, reputation, and
psychological well-being.”).
8. Helen Nissenbaum’s work sparked the current focus on privacy in public. See Helen
Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. LAW REV. 119 (2004); Helen
Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: The Challenges of Information
Technology, 7 ETHICS BEHAV. 207 (1997); Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an
Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW PHILOS. 559–596 (1998). Our
approach in terms of norms is indebted to her work. There is a well-established practice in
sociology of regarding privacy as existing in public through selective disclosure. See Stephanie
M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL
LAW REV. 905 (2010).
9. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies, 11 AM. J. SOCIOL.
441, 468 (1906).
10. CHRISTENA E. NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 22 (2010) (quoting IRWIN
ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE,
TERRITORY, CROWDING 10 (1975).
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subjects of that data. We return to this point in Section V when we
argue that ubiquitous surveillance undermines trust and poses a threat
to the self. The essential background to this claim consists in
connections among the concepts of the self, social roles, and privacy
in public. We explain those connections in Section II. We argue that
people seek to realize a multifaceted self by interacting social roles,
and that realizing a social role typically requires a significant degree
of control over how one appears to others. Privacy in public consists
in significant part in having such control. Section III argues for the
following claims. (i) People achieve control over their appearance
through conformity to informational norms, which are social norms
that govern the collection, use, and distribution of information. (ii)
Coordination under informational norms requires not just knowledge,
but what game theorists, philosophers, and computer scientists call
common knowledge. (iii) Common knowledge underlies an important
form of trust. In Section IV, we explain how social roles create
common knowledge and hence the relevant kind of trust, and in
Section V we explain how the investigative gaze undermines rolebased common knowledge and thereby erodes trust. The consequence
is an imminent threat of a precipitous decline in opportunities for selfrealization. The solution is to appropriately restrict surveillance while
preserving and restoring role-based common knowledge and the trust
it creates. Privacy advocates and policy makers have focused on the
first task but ignored the second. We conclude Section V by arguing
that the second task urgent. The reason is the threat to the self that
pervasive surveillance creates. Section V explains and evaluates that
threat.
I. THE INVESTIGATIVE GAZE
Othello’s “I see” illustrates what we will call the investigative
gaze. To investigate is to search out and examine details in order to
learn hidden facts. To gaze is to look steadily and intently. Othello
looks at Desdemona steadily and intently in hopes of revealing facts
that will show whether she is faithful. Businesses and governments
gaze steadily and intently virtually everyone searching for facts that
will show them what they want to know.
The investigative gaze includes an observational gaze, and a
predictive gaze.
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A. The Observational Gaze
The “I’ll see” of contemporary surveillance gives businesses and
governments a massive capacity to observe a person’s past. It is that
capacity we will refer to as the observational gaze. It is only a small
exaggeration to say that the observational gaze records every
keystroke, each mouse click, every touch of the screen, card swipe,
Google search, Amazon purchase, Instagram, “like,” tweet, scan—
in short, everything we do in our new digital age can be recorded,
stored, and monitored. Every routine act on our iPads and tablets,
on our laptops, notebooks, and Kindles, office PCs and
smartphones, every transaction with our debit card, gym pass, EZPass, bus pass, and loyalty cards can be archived, data-mined,
11
and traced back to us.

Data collection is so pervasive that “if you figure that your life is
so disorganized, private, and fragmented that no biographer would or
could keep track of it, think again—your biography is being written as
you read these pages.”12 The information flows into vast databases.
Retailers, banks, governments, social networking sites, credit
reference agencies and telecoms companies, amongst others, hold
vast amounts of information about us. They know where we live,
what we spend our money on, who our friends and family are, our
likes and dislikes, our lifestyles and our opinions. Every year the
amount of electronic information about us grows as we
increasingly use internet services, social media and smart devices
13
to move more and more of our lives into the online environment.

Not all the stored information is true. Indeed, “databases are
riddled with errors and meaningless coincidences.”14 However, while
not always true, the observational gaze often is.

11. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
1 (2015).
12. JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 43 (2012).
13. STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA: MYTHS,
MISCONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 1 (2014).
14. See, e.g., Simson L. Garfinkel, Data Fusion: Information of the World, Unite!, 299
SCI. AM. 82 (2008). A recent study of ratings of creditworthiness from the National Consumer
Law Center found that the reports it requested “were riddled with inaccuracies. Errors ranged
from the mundane—a wrong e-mail address or incorrect phone number—to seriously flawed.
One of the reports combined information about our volunteer with information about two other
individuals; other reports listed wrong addresses, relatives, and occupations. Interestingly,
eBureau touts its ability to estimate income based on its advanced models and offer insights
based upon the consumer’s education. Despite that claim, seven of the fifteen consumer reports
generated by eBureau contained errors in estimated income, nearly doubling the salary of one
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Palantir is a good illustration. Palantir sells “platforms for
integrating, managing, and securing data.”15 It can tie “together
surveillance video. . . with credit-card transactions, cell-phone call
records, e-mails, airplane travel records, and Web search
information.”16 To illustrate how their products work, they present a
fictional scenario in which Mike Fikri (a fictional character) gets a
speeding ticket on his way to Orlando, Florida.17 The ticket sets off an
alert in the CIA’s Palantir system, prompting an analyst to search for
data. A graphical user interface displays the results: finger print and
DNA evidence collected in Cairo; an ATM video from Miami; photos
of his rental truck license plate at a tollbooth; phone records showing
calls to Syria; and, a map of his national and international
movements. Mouse clicks reveal more: Fikri has been wiring money
to the people he has been calling in Syria; the Syrians, under
investigation already, have been meeting every day for two weeks and
have purchased plane tickets with Fikri’s money. A map traces the
money flow from Cairo to Fikri in Miami, and from Fikri to the
Syrians. In light of the information, the Miami police arrest Fikri.
Fikri is fictional, but the capacity to know it illustrates is real. The
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), for example, reports that
“Detectives love the type of information it [Palantir] provides. They
can now do things that we could not do before. They can now exactly
see great information and the links between events and people. It’s
brought great success to LAPD.” 18
The massive capacity to know evokes the often used metaphor of
the Panopticon.19 The Panopticon is a prison consisting of two

participant and halving the salary of another, and eleven of the fifteen reports incorrectly stated
the volunteer’s education level.” PERSIS YU, ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, BIG
DATA, A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SCORING CONSUMER CREDITWORTHINESS 18 (2014), http://
www.nclc.org/issues/big-data.html.
15. About | Palantir, PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.palantir.com/about/ (last
visited Jun 14, 2014).
16. Ashlee Vance & Brad Stone, Palantir, the War on Terror’s Secret Weapon,
BUSINESSWEEK (NOV. 22, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/5771-palantirthe-war-on-terrors-secret-weapon.
17. Fikri is a fictional character Palantir uses when it shows prospective customers how
its products work. See id.
18. Matt Burns, Leaked Palantir Doc Reveals Uses, Specific Functions And Key Clients,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 30, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/11/leaked-palantir-doc-revealsuses-specific-functions-and-key-clients/.
19. The source of the metaphor is JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE
INSPECTION-HOUSE (2008). As Julie Cohen notes, “[i]mportant work in information privacy
often invokes the Panopticon and other visual metaphors to drive home important points about
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concentric circular structures. The outermost structure contains the
prisoners’ cells. The guards occupy the inner most structure, from
which they can see into any cell through windows that prevent the
prisoners from seeing the guards. The result is that the prisoners never
know when the guards are watching. The effect is that the prisoners
behave as if they were under constant surveillance. There is little or
no “as if” with today’s observational gaze. It actually watches
virtually everyone virtually all the time, and it sees more than just the
observable behavior of prisoners confined to cells. It sweeps over
vastly more data generated in a wide and diverse range of contexts
and provides far more insight into people’s inner lives than the
Panopticon guards could gain from their occasional observations.
The insight the observational gaze offers is, however, still highly
limited and selective. The reason is that data is acontextual.
“Acontextual” means not determined by context, but we will use it in
the following special sense. Data is acontextual when it does not
contain an adequate representation of the context in which it occurred.
An adequate representation is one that reveals a relevant range of the
values, purposes, and intentions of the subject (or subjects) of that
data.
B. Acontextual Data
The following example sets the stage for our discussion of
acontextual data.
A person was doing data entry for a contractor who was
developing a tracking system for young people who were under
state supervision. The frustration that finally drove her to quit the
job was that the architecture of the database didn’t allow social
service workers to include narrative information about the context
of kids’ behavior. Simply, the system tracked each student’s
“success” or “failure” in a number of different programs. So, for
example, if students stopped going to an afterschool program
because they faced a serious crisis—a death in the family or an
apartment fire, for example—a caseworker worker was forced to
check a box that reported that they failed to complete the program.
Because there was no input box for narrative case notes, there was

information-based risk.” JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE,
124 (2012).

AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE

2016] “I’LL SEE”: HOW SURVEILLANCE UNDERMINES PRIVACY 229
literally no place in the system to account for the (sometimes pages
20
of) contextual information written in the social workers’ reports.

The complaint is that the categories omit contextual information
necessary to understand the values, purposes, and intentions that
explain why the student succeeded or failed. One could, of course, add
a checkbox for “death in the family” or “apartment fire,” but that
would still fail to capture the values, purposes, and intentions behind
the student’s reaction to those events. One understands values,
purposes, and intentions through narratives that integrate them and the
context in which they occur into a meaningful pattern. No set of
checkboxes, however elaborate, will constitute such a narrative.
The point holds for databases generally. Traditional relational
databases21 store data in tables consisting of rows and columns.22
Think of each column as labeled on top with some attribute like
“height” or “is an iPhone owner.” Think of each row as labeled with
the name of a person or thing (“John Smith” or “Mazda Miata with
license plate so-and-so”) or type of person (“Chicago residents” or
“Mazda Miatas”). As you go across any row, the entries under the
columns indicate the values of attributes, so for example John Smith
might be six feet tall and not an iPhone owner.23 Organizations
carefully prepare data before they enter it into their databases.24 The
reason is that
Data is dirty, filthy, messy stuff. Often it’s incorrect, missing or
badly formatted, particularly where humans have been involved in
creating and/ or collecting it. Sometimes numeric data is held as text,
or text data is forced into fixed-length fields resulting in some data
being truncated, and so on. Consequently, a lot of the time and

20. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, DIGITAL DEAD END: FIGHTING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 95 (2011).
21. See generally ABRAHAM SILBERSHATZ, HENRY F. KORTH & S. SUDARSHAN,
DATABASE SYSTEM CONCEPTS (6th ed. 2010).
22. A traditional relational database has much the same properties as an Excel
spreadsheet, except that its underlying implementation allows it to usefully hold much larger
tables, e.g., tables with millions of rows.
23. For an attribute such as “is an iPhone owner” a computer scientist would think of the
database entries as indicating one of the two values “true” or “false”, but we can equally think of
them as indicating that the attribute is present or absent.
24. FINLAY, supra note 13 at 95 (“Maintaining data quality has always been an issue with
consumer databases. As a consequence, most organizations have checks and controls in place at
the points where data enters their systems. Data is only allowed onto their databases once it has
been formatted, cleaned, and validated.”).
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effort. . . can be spent “cleaning” the data before it’s ready to be
used.25
The result is that databases store the formatted and cleaned trails
of data detritus people leave behind as they live. They do not store
narratives tying events into a meaningful whole that reveals values,
purposes, and intentions. The data is, in this sense, highly acontextual.
This is no accident. “Institutions—from universities to software
companies to public welfare agencies—[are] organized for efficient
achievement of their appointed ends.”26 They collect data for their
purposes, not to paint faithful narrative portraits of data subjects.
But aren’t we overlooking the “big data” revolution? “Big data”
consists in large part of unstructured data.27 Examples include
multimedia files, “e-mails, blogs, web pages and transcripts of phone
conversations.”28 Such data may reveal a person’s values, purposes,
and intentions—to some extent, but it would be a mistake to think it
can be worked into “a composite sketch [of the intentions behind] of
what we like, whom we love, what we read, how we vote, and where
we protest.”29 The “composite sketch” may reveal that Victoria
recently read Sense and Sensibility, has been married to Victor for
thirty years, voted for Obama in 2012, and protested in Chicago
against immigration policy.
But it will be much more difficult for it to reveal whether she
likes Sense and Sensibility (or read it reluctantly for a reading group),
Victoria loves Victor (or is staying married for the sake of the
children), was an enthusiastic Obama supported (or a disappointed
Clinton supporter reluctantly voting for Obama), objects to
immigration policy (or is ambivalent and joined the protest to support
a friend).
A “composite sketch” will rarely do what a narrative does:
integrate context, action, conversation, and soliloquy in a meaningful
whole that reveals the values, purposes, and intentions that come to

25. Id.
26. RULE, supra note 4 at 156.
27. FINLAY, supra note 13, at 180 (“These days, things are very different. Organizations
are awash with textual and other types of unstructured data. All sorts of customer
correspondence, which until the late 1990s would have been held in racks of filing cabinets, is
now stored in electronic format; and then there is all that Internet data, such as tweets, blogs and
web pages.”).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 11.
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fruition in one’s observable activity.30 The “composite sketch” will be
an aggregation of diverse sorts of data created in different contexts
with a variety of values, purposes, and intentions, but the “sketch”
will omit what did not get recorded, and those omissions will include
a good part of the relevant context, values, purposes, and intentions.31
Acontextual data is not useless—far from it. Palantir illustrates
the power of the observational gaze to penetrate into peoples’ pasts.
Contemporary surveillance does not merely survey the past. It also
aspires to predict the future.
C. The Predictive Gaze
“The most prolific use of data mining is to identify relationships
in data that give an insight into individual preferences, and most
importantly, what someone is likely to do in a given scenario.”32 The
government does not, for example, merely observe Fikri’s past, it
predicts (as the story implies) that he is a terrorist and arrests him.
Businesses and governments use computer-based statistical
analysis to make predictions, an approach known as predictive
analytics. In many situations, “models created using predictive
analytics make better predictions than their human counterparts.”33
This is not particularly high praise. Humans are bad at prediction in
the sorts of situations in which the models do better—just somewhat
better. The predictions are quite often false. Indeed, “most predictive
models are quite poor at predicting how someone is going to
behave.”34 The results can bemuse:
I’m able to understand why [the data aggregator] Acxiom thinks I
have one child when I have none—I buy gifts for young nieces and
nephews. . . Household income is off, and shopping data says that I
made one purchase in the last 24 months for online and offline
purchases at retailers! That’s hysterical! Supposedly I’m interested
30. Deborah G. Johnson, et al., Campaign Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency, 19
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959 (2011) (using the metaphor of a house of mirrors to catalogue
the ways in which the presentation of information online can create misimpressions and
misinterpretations).
31. See FINLAY, supra note 13 (“Organizations have little control over how [unstructured
data is] supplied and formatted”).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. See also JOHN W. FOREMAN, DATA SMART: USING DATA SCIENCE TO
TRANSFORM INFORMATION INTO INSIGHT 285 (2013). (noting that “[t]he only guarantee with
forecasting is that your forecast is wrong”); Joanna Geary, DoubleClick (Google): What is it and
what does it do?, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2012/apr/23/doubleclick-tracking-trackers-cookies-web-monitoring (last visited Dec 18, 2015).
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in cooking, but I hate cooking. Perhaps the one purchase they have
35
me buying in the past 24 months was a cookbook for someone.

The predictive gaze is an often false gaze. That is hardly
surprising. The input to the predictions consists of stored data that is
to a great extent acontextual,36 and such data provides a relatively
poor basis for predicting behavior. The reason is its limited ability to
capture values, purposes, and intentions. By way of illustration,
imagine you are trying to predict whether Victoria will remain
married to Victor once their children graduate from college in two
scenarios. In the first, all you know is that Victoria has been married
to Victor for thirty years. In the second, you know that she regards her
marriage with Victor as loveless, places a large disvalue on remaining
in loveless relationships, and intends to divorce Victor when their
children graduate from college. Your knowledge of Victoria’s values,
purposes, and intentions in the second scenario obviously provides a
more reliable basis for predicting what she will do.
Given this limitation, it may seem surprising that in “many
organizations across many industries, predictive models are
generating useful predictions and are being used to significantly
enhance what those organizations are doing.”37 The explanation is
that predictive analytics works particularly well as long as the
following three conditions are met.
A significant improvement in prediction accuracy, even with low
final accuracy. Direct mailing campaigns are a good illustration. If a
company mails an offer to a more or less randomly selected list of
people with whom it has no prior relationship, about 1% of those
contacted respond.38 Using predictive analytics to select the group to
receive the mailing will improve the response rate to 10% to 20%.39
Significantly increased benefit from improved prediction
accuracy. In the mailing example, the improved response rate can
significantly increase sales. The data scientists Foster Provost and
Tom Fawcett contend that “the more data-driven a firm is, the more

35. Adam Tanner, Bizarro World Of Hilarious Mistakes Revealed In Long Secret
Personal Data Files Just Opened, FORBES, TECH (Sept. 5, 2013), http://goo.gl/S8BubO.
36. FINLAY, supra note 13 (noting that “All of the methods used to create predictive
models require data to be well structured, and the data must be categorical (e.g. occupation,
marital status and gender) or numeric (e.g. age, income and time at address). A predictive model
can’t be built if the data is not in one of these two formats.”).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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productive it is. . . [data driven decision-making] is associated with a
4%– 6% increase in productivity. . . [and] also is correlated with
higher return on assets, return on equity, asset utilization, and market
value.”40 To yield a net benefit, the increased benefit must be greater
than the costs it imposes. That is in part a question of the cost of false
positives and negatives.
False positives and false negatives either decrease from
whatever approach would otherwise be taken or are low in an
absolute sense. A false positive is the mistaken indication that the
predicted condition is present. A false negative is the mistaken
indication that it is absent. In the mailing example, there will be a lot
of both. A 10% to 20% response rate is a failure rate of 80% to 90%.
So there will be a lot of people mailed who do not respond (the false
positives). Inevitably there will also be many people not mailed who
would have responded (the false negatives). The costs are relatively
low, however. They divide into the costs to the business, costs to
consumers, and costs to society as a whole.
Assume consumers who respond (“true positives”) are better off.
Then, compared to a random list, both business and consumers are
better off, since both false positives and false negatives decrease.
Compared to not sending direct mail at all, false negatives decrease,
but false positives increase. For the business, the cost of false
positives is relatively small—the cost of preparing and sending the
direct mail. For false positive consumers the cost is simply receiving
advertisements to which they do not respond. The costs to society are
also low—at least arguably. Indeed, advertising plays a key role in
market economies, which require a flow of information between
businesses and consumers.
Advertising, and consumer responses to it, is a key component of
that flow. It would be interesting to pursue the issues advertising
raises, but that lies outside the scope of our concern here. Instead, we
continue our examination of the investigative gaze by turning to its
use to allocate costs and benefits.
D. Allocating Costs and Benefits
To allocate costs and benefits, businesses and governments use
the investigative gaze to construct digital profiles. The profiles are far

40. FOSTER PROVOST & TOM FAWCETT, DATA SCIENCE FOR BUSINESS: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DATA MINING AND DATA-ANALYTIC THINKING 6 (2013).
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from accurate portraits, as we noted above. Nonetheless, a person’s
profile is
constantly touched. It’s examined and judged. When we apply for
a bank loan, it’s our data that determines whether or not we get it.
When we try to board an airplane, it’s our data that determines
how thoroughly we get searched—or whether we get to board at
all. If the government wants to investigate us, they’re more likely
to go through our data than they are to search our homes; for a lot
of that data, they don’t even need a warrant. Who controls our data
controls our lives. It’s true. Whoever controls our data can decide
whether we can get a bank loan, on an airplane or into a country.
Or what sort of discount we get from a merchant, or even how
41
we’re treated by customer support.

This pervasive use of profiles means businesses and government
use them to allocate costs and benefits in situations in which false
positives and negatives impose considerable costs on individuals and
society. These costs can be quite high when denying or permitting
bank loans, air travel, border crossings, government searches, and
preferential treatment. Other examples include employment,42 health
insurance,43 the extension of credit,44 direct marketing,45 price
discrimination,46 and news reporting.47 In many of those cases it is, to
say the least, less than clear that the benefits outweigh the costs.48

41. Bruce Schneier, Essays: Our Data, Ourselves, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY, (May 15,
2008), https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2008/05/our_data_ourselves.html.
42. See Beth Givens, Public Records on the Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, PRIVACY
RIGHTS CLEARING HOUSE
(April
12,
2002),
https://www.privacyrights.org/ar/
onlinepubrecs.htm; Joseph Walker, Do New Job Tests Foster Bias?, THE WALL ST. J.,
(September
20,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10000872396390443890304578006283936708970.html.
43. See ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: THE CRISIS
IN ONLINE PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY 107-09 (2013).
44. See RULE, supra note 5, at 197-99 (discussing the greatly enhanced ability of
creditors to determine whether their criteria of credit worthiness are fulfilled).; Andy Oram,
Credit card company data mining makes us all instances of a type, O’REILLY RADAR (May 14,
2009), http://radar.oreilly.com/2009/05/credit-card-company-data-minin.html; Charles Duhigg,
What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, (May 12,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html.
45. SLOAN & WARNER, supra note 43, at 96 (discussing norms involved in direct
marketing).
46. Price discrimination and its data collection practices are controversial. Andrew
Odlyzko, Privacy and the clandestine evolution of e-commerce, in ICEC ‘07: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 3–6 (2007).
47. Technology has both expanded reporters access to information and their ability to
report it through non-traditional means such as blogs. The greatly increased depth to which
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It is hardly surprising then that allocative uses of acontextual
data have provoked extensive criticism. We briefly review the
criticisms, and we contrast them with a second critique. That critique
is concerned with the massive capacity to know as realized in the
investigative gaze, and it focuses on the effects surveillance has
independently of its allocative use. We refine and extend this second
line of criticism. Before doing so, however, we briefly summarize
both critiques in order to set our proposals against the proper
background.
E. Two Critiques
We begin with the critique of using the investigative gaze for
allocation.
1. The critique of allocation
The critique of using the investigative gaze for allocation takes
different forms in the case of the government and private business.
The governmental critique focuses on the use of surveillance to
discourage and prevent behavior of which the government
disapproves.49 Critics claim that the government illegitimately uses
surveillance to discourage or prevent activities typically considered
permissible in a democratic state.50 The wide and penetrating reach of
governmental surveillance affects a disturbingly long list of types of
people.51 Still, most people are not on that list. So, how does
surveillance harm them? Critics answer by identifying a long-term,
systemic harm. They contend that some or all of the uses are
illegitimate exercises of governmental power that harm society as a
whole by limiting free expression and political debate and creating a
culture of oppression.52
The critique of private business surveillance is diffuse and
complex. Our goal, however, is to contrast that critique with the
critique of the capacity to know, and for that purpose, it is sufficient
reporters can penetrate into people’s lives is highly controversial. JON L MILLS, PRIVACY: THE
LOST RIGHT 287 (2008).
48. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
49. See Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, The Self, the Stasi, and the NSA: Privacy,
Knowledge, and Complicity in the Surveillance State, 17 MINN. J. LAW SCI. & TECHN. 347, 38084 (2016).
50. See id. at 380-81.
51. See id. at 380.
52. See id. at 372-74 n. 102-16 and accompanying text.
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to list six main criticisms. They are that information processing
practices: (1) discriminate among individuals in unfair ways,53 (2)
result in a distribution of costs and benefits across society that is
unjust,54 (3) create a chilling effect that leads to excessive
conformity,55 (4) lack transparency and accountability,56 (5) fail to
ensure free and informed consent to the collection and use of data,57

53. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 72; SLOAN & WARNER, supra note 43, at 273302.
54. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 45;
RULE, supra note 4, at 12.
55. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA FROM
SLAVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR 92 (2004) (noting that “[u]biquitous but fragmented,
commercial surveillance helps make us obedient; it create consumers with predictable tastes,
borrowers who repay their debts, and personality structures acclimated to cooperation with
authority”); HEIDI BOGHOSIAN & LEWIS LAPHAM, SPYING ON DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE, CORPORATE POWER AND PUBLIC RESISTANCE 27 (2013) (“Distracted by the
rush and convenience of information technology, few of us discern that opening a window into
our personal transactions helps shape a culture of conformity and normalizes the nefarious
business of domestic intelligence gathering”); PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 15 (“In his book
Turing’s Cathedral, George Dyson quipped that ‘Facebook defines who we are, Amazon defines
what we want, and Google defines what we think.’ We can extend that epigram to include
finance, which defines what we have (materially, at least), and reputation, which increasingly
defines our opportunities.”).
56. See e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 61.
57. The criticism here is extensive. An early and influential critique is Paul Schwartz,
Internet Privacy and the State, 22 CONN. LAW REV. 815 (2000) (Notice and Choice does not
ensure free choice because of information asymmetries, collective action problems, limited
rationality, and a lack of market options). More recent critiques include: MARGARET JANE
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013)
(Notice and choice as implemented is inconsistent with the requirements of free choice);
COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY AND U.S. PIRG, IN THE MATTER OF A
PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT ON PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 33 (2011), http://
www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyreportframework/00338-57839.pdf (“Informed consent in the
digital marketing era requires . . . a new commitment to candor and honesty .#.#. [the online
marketing industry] needs to clearly explain to the user how the data are collected and used”);
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DEDALUS 32, 36 (2011)
(noting “the transparency paradox. Achieving transparency means conveying information
handling practices [however] If notice . . . finely details every [relevant fact] .#.#. we know that
it is unlikely to be understood, let alone read. But summarizing practices in the style of, say,
nutrition labels is no more helpful because it drains away important details, ones that are likely
to make a difference,” and arguing for a much greater reliance on context); Solon Barocas &
Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE APPLICATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC INFORMATION (2009), http://senseable.mit.edu/
engagingdata/downloads.html (consumers “confront . . . full-on barriers to achieving meaningful
understanding of the practice and uses to which they are expected to be able to consent.”); Paul
M. Schwartz & Daniel Solove, Notice and Choice: Implications for Digital Marketing to Youth,
(2009),
http://digitalads.org/documents/Schwartz_Solove_Notice_Choice_NPLAN_BMSG_
memo.pdf (Notice and Choice fails to ensure a free choice and fails to ensure an informed
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and (6) contribute to governmental surveillance in ways that are
inadequately regulated.58
2. The critique of the capacity to know
The critique of the capacity to know addresses the negative
effects surveillance has independently of the allocation of costs and
benefits. 59 As Bruce Schneier notes,
Psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, novelists, and
technologists have all written about the effects of constant
surveillance, or even just the perception of constant surveillance.
Studies show that. . . [s]urveillance strips us of our dignity. It
threatens our very selves as individuals. It’s a dehumanizing tactic
60
employed in prisons and detention camps around the world.

The open question is why—and under what conditions—
surveillance “threatens our very selves as individuals.” It does not
appear to do so in all cases. Consider public health, for example.
Public health officials record details of disease and treatment, often in
ways that allow personal identification. That information
has provided the foundation for planning, intervention, and disease
prevention and has been critical for epidemiological research into
patterns of morbidity and mortality for a wide variety of diseases
and conditions. Registries have been essential for tracking
individuals and their conditions over time. Surveillance has also

choice); Fred Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in THE FAILURE OF
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES 342, 369 (Jane Winn ed., 2006) (“as transposed into
contemporary privacy laws and regulations, FIPPS [Fair Information Privacy Practices] have
been used to glorify individual choice as if that, and not appropriate privacy protection, were the
goal of data protection. While privacy advocates and policymakers cling tenaciously to FIPPS,
at least in their rhetoric, the reality is that FIPPS as applied today largely disserve both privacy
and other important societal interests.”); J. Howard, III Beales & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or
Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information, UNIV. CHIC. LAW REV. 109–
135, 114 (2008) (“The reality that decisions about information sharing are not worth thinking
about for the vast majority of consumers contradicts the fundamental premise of the notice
approach to privacy.”); RULE, supra note 4 (privacy advocates pay insufficient attention to how
to balance privacy versus competing concerns).
58. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, The Public-Private Surveillance Partnership, SCHNEIER ON
SECURITY (July 31, 2013), https://www.schneier.com/essay-436.html.
59. See e.g., Bruce Schneier, The Internet is a surveillance state, CNN (March 16, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/16/opinion/schneier-internet-surveillance/index.html;
Sandra
Fulton, Senate Report Opens a Window Into Hidden World of Data Aggregators, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/
senate-report-opens-window-hidden-world-data-aggregators; PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 61.
60. BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 127 (2015).
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served to trigger the imposition of public health control measures,
61
such as contact tracing, mandatory treatment, and quarantine.

Controversies abound over the appropriate type and acceptable
extent of public health surveillance,62 but few would deny that some
surveillance is justified, and it seems difficult to see how
appropriately circumscribed public health surveillance poses a threat
to the self.63
We take the critics’ concern, however, to be, not with particular
cases, but with the consequences of a ubiquity to the investigative
gaze and in particular its use to create “profiles of individuals and
groups based on their activities, connections, performances,
transactions and movements that relate to, among other things,
government departments.”64 The concern is that “[o]ur identity is
understood by others—and by inanimate machines—more from our
data-image than from our personal communication.”65 The problem is
that
[p]articular forms of communication are a vital aspect of what it
means to be human. What we disclose to whom, and under what
conditions, is highly significant. What once we might have
revealed, consciously, about ourselves to someone we trust—
friend, doctor, priest, therapist—may now be involuntarily
disclosed by electronic means to organizations or machines that we
66
cannot know, let alone trust, in the same way.

The question, however, remains: why is pervasive use of digital
profiles a threat to identity? There is no question that the ubiquity of
the investigative gaze signals a profound change in the way people
relate to businesses, governments, and each other, but why isn’t that
just a change? Why is it a “threat to our very selves”?67

61. AMY L. FAIRCHILD ET AL., SEARCHING EYES: PRIVACY, THE STATE, AND DISEASE
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 204 (2007). For concern about the sharing of health information,
see, e.g., Lori Andrews et al., Privacy Policies of Android Diabetes Apps and Sharing of Health
Information, 315 JAMA: THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1051
(2016), and Lori Andrews, Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues in Genetic Testing for Complex
Genetic Diseases, VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 793 (2003).
62. See generally FAIRCHILD ET AL., supra note 61.
63. Id.
64. DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE AFTER SNOWDEN 81 (2015).
65. LYON, supra note 54, at 19.
66. Id.
67. BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 127 (2015).
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Commentators offer a variety of metaphors that suggest
directions in which to pursue possible explanations. People become
“mere algorithm fodder,”68 “nodes of information production,”69 and
puppets manipulated through “invisible threads.”70 Jean Baudrillard
offers one of the more elaborate and suggestive characterizations:
We are constantly confronted with the anticipated statistical
verification of our behavior, and absorbed by this permanent
refraction of our least movements, we are no longer confronted
with our own will. We are no longer even alienated. . . each
individual is forced despite himself or herself into the undivided
coherency of statistics. There is in this a positive absorption into
the transparency of computers, which is something worse than
71
alienation.

We will return to these metpahors in Section V, but our initial
guiding metaphor is different. It is Othello.
Othello’s “I’ll see” leads him, under Iago’s spell, to construct a
“data profile” of Desdemona that paints her as unfaithful, a “whore”
in Othello’s eyes.72 Othello constructs the profile out of acontextual

68. PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 198.
69. RONALD J. DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: INSIDE THE BATTLE FOR CYBERSPACE 63 (2011)
(noting that “we no longer move about our lives as self-contained beings, but as nodes of
information production in a dense network of digital relations involving other nodes of
information production”).
70. ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 208 (2003). The full quote is:
“As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record, each containing a
number of questions . . . . There are thus hundreds of little threads radiating from every man,
millions of threads in all . . . they are not visible . . . but every man is constantly aware of their
existence . . . . Each man, permanently aware of his own invisible threads, naturally develops a
respect for the people who manipulate the threads.” Bruce Schneier has applied the passage to
contemporary surveillance. Bruce Schneier, The Value of Privacy, WASH. NOTE, (June 9, 2006),
http://washingtonnote.com/bruce_schneier_1/.
71. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED WRITINGS 213 (2001).
72. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, [a]ct 4, sc. 2
(DESDEMONA
Alas, what ignorant sin have I committed?
OTHELLO
Was this fair paper, this most goodly book,
Made to write “whore” upon? What committed!
Committed!—O thou public commoner!
I should make very forges of my cheeks,
That would to cinders burn up modesty,
Did I but speak thy deeds.—What committed!
Heaven stops the nose at it, and the moon winks;
The bawdy wind, that kisses all it meets,
Is hush’d within the hollow mine of earth,
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data—data torn out of the context that reveals values, purposes, and
intentions. A good example is Othello’s eavesdropping s on a
conversation between Iago and Cassio about Cassio’s mistress,
Bianca. Iago sets up both the conversation and the eavesdropping
because he knows that Othello will interpret the conversation to be
about Cassio’s non-existent affair with Desdemona, and
As he [Cassio] shall smile Othello shall go mad;
And his unbookish jealousy must construe
Poor Cassio’s smiles, gestures, and light behavior
Quite in the wrong.

73

Othello does “go mad.” He no longer trusts Desdemona and
summarily dismisses as lies her professions of love. Fixated on her
data profile, he no longer perceives the real Desdemona, whom he
finally kills—thinking he is killing the data-profile-Desdemona.
Othello suggests that fixation on acontextual data profiles can destroy
trust and threaten the self by rendering it no longer visible. We
develop this suggestion in Section V. The essential background
consists in important connections among the concepts of the self,
social roles, and privacy in public.
II. SELF, SOCIAL ROLES, AND PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
We begin with a summary of the connections we will describe.
There are four key points. (1) People typically strive to realize a
multifaceted self. (2) One realizes such a self in large part through a
variety of social roles. (3) In a wide range of cases, realizing a social
role requires a significant degree of control over how one appears to
others. (4) Adequate control over how one appears is essential to an
adequate degree of privacy in public.
A. The Multifaceted Self
William James characterizes the relevant notion of the self.74 “I
am,” James writes,

And will not hear it.—What committed!—
Impudent strumpet!).
73. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1.
74. There is more than one candidate for the label “concept of the self.” In particular,
there are “pure ego” or “center” theories. See C. D BROAD, THE MIND AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE
558f. (2009); COLIN MCGINN, THE CHARACTER OF MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 111f. (2nd ed. 1997). For a commitment based theory of the self, see
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often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my. . .
selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could,
be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and
make a million a year, be a wit, a bon vivant, and a lady killer, as
well as a philosopher, and a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and
African explorer, as well as a ‘tone poet’ and saint. But the thing is
simply impossible. . . Such characters may at the outset of life be
alike possible to a man. But to make anyone of them actual, the
rest must be more or less suppressed. So the seeker of his truest,
strongest, deepest self must review the list carefully, and pick out
75
the one on which to stake his salvation.

James’ point is that you make yourself who you are by what you
“stand by,” that is, by the commitments you freely strive to realize.
We take that to be a widely shared conception of the self. One
correction is called for, however. James suggests that a single
commitment defines who you are.76 On the contrary, the self you seek
to realize is a multifaceted self. As John Gray notes, “the power to
conceive of ourselves in different ways, to harbour dissonant projects
and perspectives, to inform our thoughts and lives with divergent
categories and concepts, is integral to our identity as reflective
beings.”77 This conception of the self underlies liberal political
philosophy from John Stuart Mill78 to John Rawls79 and Joseph Raz.80
We place ourselves in this tradition, and assume that the realization of
a multifaceted self is an ideal people strive to realize.
You realize a multifaceted self in large part through social
roles.81 To see why, imagine trying to be a bird-watcher in a society

RICHARD WARNER, FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, AND HAPPINESS: AN ESSAY ON MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1987).
75. WILLIAM JAMES, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 309 (1890).
76. It is not at all clear that James actually thought you had to single out one self. As he
notes elsewhere, “Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals
who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind . . . . Nothing is commoner than to
hear people discriminate between their different selves of this sort: ‘As a man I pity you, but as
an official I must show you no mercy; as a politician I regard him as an ally, but as a moralist I
loathe him;’ etc., etc.” Id. at 295.
77. JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 262 – 263 (1993).
78. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., Yale University Press 2003) (1859).
79. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993).
80. See generally Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986).
81. Id. at 311 (emphasizing the importance of social roles—what he calls “social
forms”—to the development of the self).
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that does not recognize that role. You track birds to look at them,82
but that does not make you a bird watcher in the sense that a member
of the Audubon Society is. To be a bird watcher in that sense is to
fulfill a role society recognizes, and you can refer to that role to
explain your actions to yourself and others. In the imagined society,
no such explanation is available. You are just a bird-watching
anomaly. Similar remarks hold for an immense variety of examples.
You cannot be a lawyer, medical doctor, or racecar driver unless
society recognizes the role. Even being a parent, child, lover, or
spouse take on different meanings depending on the society in which
the relationships are realized.83
B. Controlling How One Appears
In the case of many roles, realizing them requires a significant
degree of control over how one appears to others. We have discussed
a number of examples elsewhere.84 Two examples are sufficient for
our purposes here. Students and teachers provide the first example,
and journalists the second.
1. Students and teachers
University students and teachers share a goal that they can
realize only if they can control how they appear to each other. The
goal is that teachers should assign grades only on the basis of relevant
academic work.85 Accepting this goal and seeking to realize it is part
of what constitutes properly realizing the teacher role. To reliably
achieve the goal, teachers must minimize bias, and that requires that
students have a relevant degree of control over how they appear to
their teachers. Students need to appear to teachers primarily in the
light of their relevant academic achievements, not in light of
extracurricular aspects of their personalities, past academic records,
honors, or punishments. To ensure the appropriate appearance,

82. Id. at 310.
83. See id.
84. See Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power: Is It All Over?, 17
TUL. J. TECH. INTELL. PROP. 61 (2014); Sloan & Warner, supra note 49.
85. See, e.g., Staff and Student Confidentiality, ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS AND
LECTURERS (2013), https://www.atl.org.uk/help-and-advice/school-and-college/staff-studentconfidentiality.asp; Jonita Davis, Teachers’ Responsibilities for Student Confidentiality; EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/info_8700551_teachers-responsibilities-student-confidentiality.html;
Student Records and Confidentiality, WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
(2013),
http://dpi.wi.gov/sspw/pupil-services/school-social-work/contents/confidentiality/
student-records.

2016] “I’LL SEE”: HOW SURVEILLANCE UNDERMINES PRIVACY 243
students need the cooperation of other students and teachers. The
reason is that how you appear to someone depends on what they know
about you (you cannot, for example appear truthful to someone who
knows you are lying).
Thus, students and teachers must both voluntarily limit
themselves. Teachers must limit what they tell other teachers and the
university about the students they know, and students must limit their
disclosure of what they know about other students.
2. Journalists
Journalists investigating governmental wrongdoing share a goal:
protecting the political independence of the press by protecting the
identities of their whistleblowing sources from unwanted
disclosures.86 To realize this goal, journalists must appear to both the
government and to their sources as “essential checks on government
and partners in ensuring a healthy democratic debate,”87 not as
criminals whom the state should prosecute. The point finds ample
confirmation in the Obama administration’s unprecedented threats
and prosecutions of journalists. Human Rights Watch and the
American Civil Liberties Union report:
Journalists expressed concern that, rather than being treated as
essential checks on government and partners in ensuring a healthy
democratic debate, they may be viewed as suspect for doing their
jobs. One prominent journalist summed up what many seemed to
be feeling: “I don’t want the government to force me to act like a
88
spy. I’m not a spy; I’m a journalist.”

The complaint is precisely that journalists appear as criminals
not as partners. That appearance has a predictable effect on sources:
they are reluctant to work with investigative journalists. As The New
York Times journalist Philip Shenon remarked, “My goodness, if I
were one of my sources, I would never talk to me again, even about
stories that really would have been a public service.”89 Journalists

86. See, e.g., Commisioner for Human Rights, ETHICAL JOURNALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
COUNCIL
OF
EUROPE
(2011),
https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=1863637#P252_37545.
87. Human Rights Watch, With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large-Scale US Surveillance
is Harming Journalism (July 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/dem14withlibertytomonitorall-07282014.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Molly Redden, Is the “Chilling Effect” Real?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 2013, http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/113219/doj-seizure-ap-records-raises-question-chilling-effectreal (last visited Feb 1, 2015).
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need to cooperate with each other to appear appropriately. Faced with
the massive power of the state, no journalist can unilaterally ensure
that he or she appears as a partner, not a criminal.90 That takes a
concerted effort of a critical mass of journalists—enough to serve as
an effective counterweight to state power. This is not to say that the
journalists’ concerted efforts are always an effective counterweight.
The state must also exercise some restraint in the prosecution of
journalists.91
Similar remarks hold for a wide variety of social roles. People
interacting in those roles share a goal that can only be realized
through controlling how they appear, and they cannot achieve that
control unilaterally but require the cooperation of others.
Acquaintances, colleagues, friends, and family typically share the
goal of cordial and harmonious relations. Realizing that goal requires
controlling appearances through the selective distribution of
information, and ensuring selectivity requires cooperation. It is easy
to think of relevant goals for any number of other examples involving
selective information flows. A washing machine salesperson can ask
how frequently you plan to do laundry, but not whether you text or
email more, whereas the opposite is true for an Apple store
salesperson. The clerk in the wine store cannot ask how many ounces
of alcohol you consume a day, but your doctor can. Pharmacists can
ask what other drugs you are taking to guard against drug interactions,
but not about whether you are happy in your personal relationships;
your internist and therapist can ask about both. And so on for lawyers,
real estate agents, repair services, taxi drivers, mechanics, and on and
on.
People’s interactions through social roles weave a complex
network over which information flows selectively. We have been
emphasizing the role of that network in facilitating self-realization.
Now we turn from the connections to the self to the connections to
privacy. The role-based interactions through which one selectively
discloses information create an important kind of privacy.

See e.g., GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA,
(2014). We discuss the point at greater length in Sloan and
Warner, supra note 81.
91. Prior to the Obama administration, “the Justice Department’s internal guidelines
caution prosecutors against compelling the disclosure of the identity of a reporter’s sources.”
RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS: THE DILEMMA OF STATE SECRECY 106 (2013).
90.

AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE
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C. The Privacy Spectrum
Private and public are “sliding scale” opposites.92 Think of a
spectrum whose endpoints are “completely inaccessible to others”
(the maximally private end) and “completely accessible to others”
(the maximally public end). We divide the spectrum into four regions.
Information that is enclosed occupies a region at the maximally
private end. To enclose information is to surround it with a barrier
that prevents others’ access, either entirely or for all but a select group
of family, friends, or associates.93 Obscure information comprises the
next region. Information is obscure when it is difficult to find or
understand.94 Information selectively disclosed in role-based
interactions follow in that order, and fully public information
occupies the maximally public end. Obscurity and role-based
disclosure constitute privacy in public. Both facilitate the limited
sharing of information. As Bruce Schneier notes, “Privacy isn’t about
hiding something. It’s about being able to control how we present
ourselves to the world. It’s about maintaining a public face while at
the same time being permitted private thoughts and actions.”95
While enclosure and obscurity both merit detailed discussion, we
focus on role-based disclosure. Role-based interactions facilitate the
creation of privacy in public through the parties’ coordinating their
efforts to ensure the selective disclosure of information. People who
coordinate in this way are often strangers. This point will play an
important role in what follows, so we conclude this section by
explaining the point more fully.
To begin, we note that coordination between strangers is just one
example of coordination between people when the only relevant
knowledge that they have of each other is that they present
themselves as being in certain social roles. You may, for example,
have known your auto mechanic for years, but know very little about
him relevant to your coordination as customer and service provider
except that she presents herself as an auto mechanic (and that her
efforts seem to keep your car running). The point is the lack of
knowledge relevant to coordination. When people interacting in

92. NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 10, at 4 (“[p]rivacy and publicity . . . are each defined with
and by each other along [a] conceptual sliding scale.”).
93. See Sloan and Warner, supra note 49 at 354.
94. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101
CAL REV 1, 1 (2012).
95. Bruce Schneier, Crypto-Gram, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Sept. 15, 2015), https://
www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2015/0915.html.

246

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 32

social roles coordinate under informational norms, the knowledge
they have that is relevant to that coordination is that they present
themselves in certain roles. Such role-based coordination is a constant
feature of daily life. As Bruce Schneier notes,
Just today, a stranger came to my door claiming he was here to
unclog a bathroom drain. I let him into my house without verifying
his identity, and not only did he repair the drain, he also took off
his shoes so he wouldn’t track mud on my floors. When he was
done, I gave him a piece of paper that asked my bank to give him
some money. He accepted it without a second glance. At no point
did he attempt to take my possessions, and at no point did I attempt
the same of him. In fact, neither of us worried that the other
would. . . Also today, I passed several strangers on the street
without any of them attacking me. I bought food from a grocery
store, not at all concerned that it might be unfit for human
consumption. I locked my front door, but didn’t spare a moment’s
worry at how easy it would be for someone to smash my window
in. Even people driving cars, large murderous instruments that
96
could crush me like a bug, didn’t scare me.

Coordination is of course not confined to those whose only
relevant knowledge is social roles. It occurs across an entire spectrum
of knowledge. The minimal knowledge end is home to those whose
relevant knowledge of each other consists primarily in the fact that
they are interacting in certain roles. We focus on the region around
the “minimal knowledge” end where, even if the people know each
other well in some ways, the knowledge they have relevant to
coordination consists primarily of their role presentations. We will
refer to people in this region as coordination-strangers, and we will
shorten that to just “strangers” when the context makes it clear what
we mean.
Strangers typically coordinate in selectively disclosing
information easily, without explicit thought or negotiation. How does
that happen? Through informational norms. Understanding how
informational norms do so is the key to understanding how the
investigative gaze undermines trust.
III. NORM-ENABLED COORDINATION
Informational norms are social norms that constrain the
collection, use, and distribution of information. They

96. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS: ENABLING THE TRUST THAT SOCIETY
NEEDS TO THRIVE 1 (2012).
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circumscribe the type or nature of information about various
individuals that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or
even demanded to be revealed. In medical contexts, it is
appropriate to share details of our physical condition or, more
specifically, the patient shares information about his or her
physical condition with the physician but not vice versa; among
friends we may pour over romantic entanglements (our own and
those of others); to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial
information; with our professors, we discuss our own grades; at
work, it is appropriate to discuss work-related goals and the details
97
and quality of performance.

How do informational norms explain the coordination that
creates privacy in public? We answer in two steps. First, we note that
the informational norms that facilitate the coordination essential to
privacy in public are instances of a particular type of norm—
coordination norms. Second, we note that a special knowledge
structure explains how coordination norms facilitate coordination. It
is that structure that the investigative gaze undermines.
A. Coordination Norms
Driving on the right is a classic example of a coordination norm.
Drivers share a goal. Safety and convenience dictate that they drive
on the same side as everyone else. No driver can unilaterally realize
that goal. Drivers must cooperate with other drivers to do so. In “drive
on the right” countries like the United States, drivers realize the goal
of driving on the same side by all driving on the right—as long as
they know others will do so too. If everyone knew that everyone
would drive on the left, everyone would drive on the left.98 They think
they ought drive on the left because and only as long as other drivers
also drive on the left. We define coordination norms by generalizing
from this example.
A coordination norm is a behavioral regularity in a group, where
the regularity exists at least in part because almost everyone thinks
that, in order to realize a shared goal, he or she ought to conform to
the regularity as long as everyone else does.99 The “ought” calls for a
brief comment. Not all thoughts about what one ought to do are
97. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. LAW REV. 119, 120 –
121 (2004).
98. See H. Peyton Young, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 105, 107-08 (1996) (providing a gametheoretic explanation of the decision made by individual drivers as to whether to drive on the
right or left side of the road).
99. See SLOAN & WARNER, supra note 43, at 56-59.
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effective in generating action. One may think one ought to learn
Spanish, but never do it because other demands take precedence. In
the case of coordination norms, however, the thought “I ought to
conform” typically leads to conformity. Of course, it yields
conformity only when people know (or strongly enough believe) that
others will conform.
In what follows, we will use “know” as short for “know (or
strongly enough believe).” The point to emphasize here is that people
think they ought to conform as long as others do. So, knowledge is
required. People must know that others will (limited exceptions aside)
conform; then, they will (limited exceptions aside) conform
themselves. This appeal to knowledge to explain conformity is correct
as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. It is not just knowledge that
explains coordination, but common knowledge, a special knowledge
structure we characterize in the next section.
Our focus now is on informational norms that are also
coordination norms. Not all informational norms are coordination
norms,100 but the ones that concern us are, and from now on we will
use “informational norms” to mean “informational norms that are also
coordination norms.” The coordination informational norms facilitate
creates privacy in public through mutual voluntary restraint. We
conclude with two examples.101
1. Students and teachers
As we noted earlier, students and teachers share the goal that
teachers should assign grades primarily on the basis of relevant
academic work. Realizing that goal requires that students and teachers
coordinate to ensure the selective disclosure necessary to control over
how they appear to each other. They coordinate by conforming to the
following informational norm: within reasonable limits, students
should disclose and teachers acquire only information relevant to
evaluating students in the light of their relevant academic
achievements. Conformity is conditional because there is no point to

100. “Make your comments relevant” is an informational norm but not a coordination
norm. The hallmark of a coordination norm is that you adhere to it only as long as others do, but
you would probably adhere to the relevant comment norm even if most others did not.
101. Both examples involve professional relationships, but, as the early examples suggest,
the points generalize to a variety of different types of relationships. See supra text
accompanying n. 94. See also Warner and Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power, supra note 82
(discussing a variety of other examples).
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in trying to ensure that other teachers have limited information unless
enough other students and teachers also limit their information.
2. Journalists
Journalists share a goal: protecting the political independence of
the press by protecting the identities of their whistleblowing sources
from unwanted disclosures, and realizing that goal requires they
cooperate to ensure control over how they appear to each other.
Conformity to the following coordination norm ensures that
journalists cooperate appropriately: within broad limits, journalists
protect the political independence of the press by not revealing the
identities of their whistleblowing sources. If journalists can count on
conformity to the norm, they can count on appearing as partners in
preserving democracy, not criminals.102 Conformity is conditional. It
takes a critical mass of journalists to serve as an effective
counterweight to the power of the state. Without it, conforming to the
norm does little to protect the independence of the press.
B. What Coordination Requires
In the last section, we provisionally explained norm-enabled
coordination by noting that adherents to a coordination norm will
conform to it if they know others will. That is not, however, a full
explanation of norm-enabled coordination. An example is helpful,
and, to that end, we return to the norm of driving on the right. That is
not an informational norm, but everything we say will be true of such
norms. It just happens to be simpler and clearer to use driving on the
right as the sample case.
Suppose Victoria and Victor are stopped in their respective cars
at a four-way intersection. Victoria is on one cross street; Victor, on
the other. Victor signals a left turn, and a moment later he completes
his turn into the lane opposite Victoria. That is what Victoria was sure
he would do. But why? She and Victor are strangers. The only
relevant fact that she knows about him is that he presents himself in
the role of a driver, so it is possible, for all she knows, that Victor is
from a left-driving country and will get confused and turn into her.103
Or, enraged at what he sees as the repressive conformity of modern
life, he could have decided to flout convention by driving on the left.

102. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 87.
103. Countries that drive on the left include India, Australia, New Zealand, Southern
Africa, the Caribbean, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus, among others.
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Or it could be that he has never driven before in his life, and has no
idea that he is supposed to drive on the right. Or. . . with a little
imagination, one might sketch any number of scenarios in which
Victor drives on the left. Victoria does not give these possibilities a
moment’s thought. The same is true of Victor in regard to Victoria.
Why?
Our provisional explanation is that she knows Victor will drive
on the right, and Victor knows she will do so as well. We still owe an
explanation of how they know that, but grant for the moment that they
do. The problem is that Victoria can know that Victor will drive on
the right without Victor realizing that she knows that. Likewise for
Victoria not realizing that Victor knows that she will drive on the
right.
Focus for the moment on Victor. Imagine that, if someone were
to ask him whether Victoria knew that he would drive on the right, he
would reply, “I am not sure. She may think that I am from a leftdriving country, will get confused and turn into her, or she may
think. . .” where the dots are filled in with the possibilities in which
Victor drives on the left. The result is that Victor hesitates to begin his
left turn. He worries that Victoria may misinterpret his behavior and,
for example, begin evasive action by turning into the left lane just as
Victor is also turning into it.
Similar remarks hold for Victoria. If someone were to ask her
whether Victor knew that she would drive on the right, she would
reply, “I am not sure. He may think that I am from a left-driving
country, will get confused and turn into him, or he may think. . . .”
Like Victor, Victoria hesitates to begin her turn.
Coordination fails because of a lack of second-level knowledge.
It helps at this point to add subscripts to “know” to keep track of
levels of knowledge. The problem is that Victoria does not know2 that
Victor knows1 that she will drive on the right, and the same is true of
Victor.
So should we add all second-level knowledge requirements to
our explanation of coordination? For Victoria and Victor, this would
mean requiring that Victoria knows2 that Victor knows1 that she will
drive on the right, and that Victor knows2 the same about Victoria.
But then the same problem arises for at the third-level of knowledge.
Suppose that Victor knows2 that Victoria knows1 that Victor will
drive on the right, and suppose Victoria knows2 the same about
Victor. But suppose also that Victor does not know3 that Victoria
knows2 that Victor knows1 she will drive on the right. Instead, he
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thinks, “I know2 that Victoria knows1 that I will drive on the right, but
she does not realize I know that. She may think I think she is from a
left-driving country, will get confused, and drive on the left.” Victor
hesitates to begin his left turn. The same third-level doubt can arise
for Victoria.
In general, consider any knowledge-level n at which Victoria
knowsn that. . . knows1 that Victor will drive on the right, and Victor
knowsn that. . . knows1 that Victoria will drive on the right. With
enough ingenuity one can construct examples in which coordination
fails because one of them fails to known+1. . . that the other knows1
that he or she will drive on the right.
When driving, no one gives these possibilities any serious
consideration. No one thinks about them at all (with the exception of
academics thinking about the theory of coordination when driving).
Imagine Victor during his driving test explaining to the examiner, “I
realized I had the right of way to make a left turn, but I did not turn
because I was worried that the driver on the cross street might not
continue to drive on the right.” That would be ludicrous. Why? Why
do drivers who are strangers to each other never think, “There may be
something about the other driver that will lead him or her not to drive
on the right?” Why is coordination unhesitating, without explicit
thought or negation? The question is well known in game theory, as
the following example from the game theorist Michael Chwe
illustrates:
Each person might want to take part in an antigovernment protest
but only if there are enough total protesters to make arrests and
police repression unlikely. People most often “solve” coordination
problems by communicating with each other. Simply receiving a
message, however, is not enough to make an individual participate.
Because each individual wants to participate only if others do, each
person must also know that others received a message. For that
matter, because each person knows that other people need to be
confident that others will participate, each person must know that
other people know that other people have received a message, and
so forth. In other words, knowledge of the message is not enough;
what is also required is knowledge of others’ knowledge,
knowledge of others’ knowledge of others’ knowledge, and so
104
on.

104. MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND
COMMON KNOWLEDGE 3 (2013).
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Chwe’s solution is the standard one in game theory. The parties
have what game theorists, philosophers, and computer scientists call
common knowledge. People have common knowledge that they will
conform if they know they will conform, know they know it, know
they know they know it, and so on.
This is the solution we adopt. Parties to coordination norms
coordinate without hesitation because they have common knowledge
that the other parties will conform. Common knowledge makes the
parties transparent to each other in a way that facilitates coordination
based on knowledge of what the other parties will do. Everything is
out in the open. There is no possibility of misunderstanding,
misinterpretation, doubt, or deception at any knowledge level. We
claim that the investigative gaze undermines this transparency and
thereby makes people opaque to each other in ways that make
coordination problematic. We turn to that claim in Section V. A
necessary preliminary is to see how relevant common knowledge can
arise among strangers. The only relevant fact that strangers know
about each other is that they present themselves to each in certain
social roles. How can that scant foundation support the rich structure
of common knowledge?
IV. COMMON KNOWLEDGE
We answer by first describing a particularly clear case of
common knowledge—eye contact. We then use that as a model to
explain how role presentations create common knowledge between
strangers.
A. Eye Contact
Imagine that Alice sees Bob, an old acquaintance. She stares at
him hoping to remember his name before he sees her. Unfortunately,
Bob does see her, and Alice realizes that it would be pointless to
pretend she did not see him. It is pointless because the following
infinite sequence is true.105
We use the phrase “they see each other” as short for “Alice sees
Bob, and Bob sees Alice:”

105. See, e.g., Peter Vanderschraaf & Giacomo Sillari, Common Knowledge, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2014 ed. 2014), http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/common-knowledge/ (last visited July 1, 2015);
KEN BINMORE & ADAM BRANDEBURGER, COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND GAME THEORY (1988),
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/100630;
Paul
Milgrom,
An
axiomatic
characterization of common knowledge, 49 ECONOMETRICA 219 (1981).
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First level:
Alice knows1 that they see each other.
Bob knows1 that they see each other.

Second level:
Alice knows2 Bob knows1 that they see each other.
Bob knows2 Alice knows1 that they see each other.
Third level:
Alice knows3 Bob knows2 Alice knows1 they see each other.
Bob knows3 Alice knows2 Bob knows1 they see each other.
.
.
.

How do Alice and Bob take this infinite series of steps? Start
with the first level. Alice knows that Bob sees her by reasoning about
Bob. She reasons this way: “I see Bob with his eyes directly in line
with mine. Bob has normal perceptual abilities, so I can conclude that
Bob sees me. Now I see Bob, so I can conclude that we see each
other.” Bob reasons the same way about Alice, starting from “I see
Alice with her eyes directly in line with mine.” This gives us the first
level:
Alice knows that they see each other.
Bob knows that they see each other.

This explanation may provoke the incredulous response, “No
one reasons like that!”—and rightly so. It is extremely unlikely that
Alice (to focus on her) reasons in a way that even approximates the
reasoning we have attributed to her, and she need not reason at all.
She may just think, “We see each other!” We do not, however, intend
the reasoning we attribute to Alice to characterize what she in fact
does, but what she could do. Alice and Bob have the capacity to
explicitly reason their way to knowing that they see each other. We
characterize that capacity by exhibiting explicitly the reasoning that
Alice and Bob could produce.
The capacity to reason about each other explains how Alice and
Bob get to the second-level of knowledge. We describe reasoning as
if it was explicit, but again the point is the same: to characterize what
Alice and Bob could do, not what they actually do. Alice reasons: “At
the first level, I started from the fact I saw Bob’s eyes lined up with
mine, and I reached the conclusion that Bob sees me. If Bob sees me,

254

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 32

he sees my eyes lined up with his. Bob has normal reasoning
capacities, so, at the first level, Bob will have reasoned just as I did
from ‘Alice’s eyes are lined up with mine’ to his first-level
conclusion that we see each other.”
For Alice to realize that fact about Bob is for her to reach the
second-level conclusion: “I know2 Bob knows1 we see each other.”
Bob will reason in the same way to his second-level conclusion that
he knows2 Alice knows1 they see each other. Thus:
Alice knows2 Bob knows1 they see each other.
Bob knows2 Alice knows1 they see each other.

Alice and Bob get to the rest of the levels the way they get from
the first level to the second: by reasoning about their reasoning at the
level below. For any level n, Alice reasons about Bob’s n – 1 level
reasoning to reach the conclusion that Alice knowsn Bob knowsn - 1. . .
that they see each other, and Bob reasons in the same way to reach the
conclusion that that Bob knowsn Alice knowsn - 1. . . that they see each
other.
As we emphasized earlier, we are not claiming that Alice and
Bob actually reason in this way. We are characterizing a capacity to
generate an infinite sequence of levels of knowledge. The capacity
makes eye contact transparent. It means that Alice and Bob are
capable of decisively ruling out any possibility of doubt or deception
with regard to their seeing each other at any level of knowledge.
There is nowhere to hide, either inadvertently or by design. People
achieve a similar transparency when they present themselves in social
roles.
The point of our discussion of eye contact is to use it as a model
of how social roles create common knowledge. To that end, note that
the following feature of eye contact explains how it generates
common knowledge. In describing this feature, we focus on Alice, but
the same comments hold for Bob, and the fact that what we say is true
for both is the feature in question. The feature: Alice’s having her
eyes directly in line with Bob’s is sufficient for her to know1 that she
sees Bob, and her having her eyes directly in line with Bob’s is
sufficient for her to know2 that Bob knows1 that Alice’s eyes are
directly in line with his. Social roles give rise to common knowledge
in the same way.
B. How Social Roles Generate Common Knowledge
So what is the analogue of having eyes directly in line for social
roles? An example helps. Imagine that a student, Roger, visits his
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professor, Sarah, during her office hours. Roger presents himself in
the role of a student; Sarah presents herself in the role of a professor.
Their presentations of themselves in those roles is sufficient for Roger
to know1 that Sarah will conform to the student/teacher norm, and it is
sufficient for Roger to know2 that Sarah knows1 that they present
themselves to each other in those roles. The same is true for Sarah:
the role presentations are sufficient for Sarah to know1 that Roger will
conform to the student/teacher norm, and it is sufficient for Sarah to
know2 that Roger knows1 that the present themselves in the roles.
To explain how this happens, we begin with sports stadium
advertising. The game theorist Michal Chwe notes that, during a game
in 1996,
baseball fans at Cleveland’s Jacobs Field [looked] up to see an
airplane pulling a banner advertising anonymous HIV testing.
Obviously the irony here is the airing of such a sensitive issue as
AIDS publicly and even festively on a bright sunny day at the
ballpark. . . [The underlying purpose is that] I would be more
likely to get an HIV test if I knew that doing so was not unusual,
but I wouldn’t find this out through everyday conversation; at the
ballpark, looking up at the plane, however, it is obvious to all that
106
everyone is seeing the same thing.

Thus, for everyone, seeing the sign was sufficient for knowing that
anonymous HIV testing was available, and—because it was “obvious
to all that everyone is seeing the same thing”—seeing the sign was
sufficient for each person seeing it to know that everyone saw it, at
least everyone who was paying minimal attention to what was
happening above the stadium. These two features made it common
knowledge among the “paying minimal attention” group that
anonymous HIV testing was available.
The resulting common knowledge comes from two factors: (1)
Almost everyone knows that the banner is flying over the stadium,
and (2) almost everyone knows that almost everyone knows that. (1)
and (2) give rise to the infinite sequence of knowledge levels that
constitute common knowledge that a banner is flying over the
stadium. (1) and (2) make it a simple matter to get to the first two
levels of knowledge.107

106. CHWE, supra note 104, at 41.
107. We are following Davd Lewis. “[T]he basic idea behind Lewis’ argument is that for a
set of agents, if a proposition A is publicly known among them and each agent knows that
everyone can draw the same conclusion p from A that she can, then p is common
knowledge.” Vanderschraaf & Sillari, supra note 105. The same idea underlies Stephen
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Suppose, for example, Colin and Megan are sitting together in
the stadium. Colin reasons this way at his first level of knowledge. “I
know I see the banner, and I know that Megan does too. So we both
know that a banner is flying over the stadium.” Megan reasons in the
same way to her first-level conclusion that they both know a banner is
flying over the stadium.
At the second level, Colin reasons as follows: “I reasoned to my
first-level conclusion from the fact the Megan knows that a banner is
flying over the stadium to the conclusion that we both know that.
Megan knows that I know that a banner is flying over the stadium, so
she will have reasoned in the same way the to her first-level
conclusion that we both know that a banner is flying over the
stadium.” For Colin to reach that conclusion is for him to know that
they know that a banner is flying over the stadium. Megan reasons in
the same way to her conclusion that they both know that they know.
Once they get to the second level, Colin and Megan reach the rest of
the levels by reasoning about their reasoning at the levels below.
Of course, flying banners over stadiums is not the only way to
create situations in which “it is obvious to all that everyone is seeing
[learning, apprehending] the same thing.”108 Education and
acculturation also routinely provide a basis for common knowledge in
the same way.109 In the United States, for example, a process of
explicit and implicit instruction, discussion, and correction makes it
obvious to everyone—at least those with a minimum of basic
education—that everyone learns that George Washington was the first
president of the United States. Thus, not only is it true that: (1) almost
everyone in the United States learns that George Washington was the
first president; it is also true that (2) almost everyone knows that
almost everyone learns that. Social roles and associated informational
norms generate common knowledge in this way.
Consider the student/teacher norm. In the appropriate group
(which includes at least students and teachers at large universities),
education and acculturation result in everyone knowing that students
and teachers conform to the student/teacher norm, and in everyone
knowing that everyone knows that everyone is subject to that process
of education and acculturation. So, not only do students and teachers

Schiffer’s treatment of common knowledge (which he calls “mutual knowledge”). STEPHEN
SCHIFFER, MEANING 32-35 (1973). Following CHWE, supra note 104, at 41, we add an account
of how a proposition can become “publicly known.”
108. CHWE, supra note 104, at 41.
109. TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (2012).
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know that students and teachers adhere to the student/teacher norm,
they know that they know that. The result is common knowledge of
conformity to the norm.
Roger and Sarah, for example, get to the first level of knowledge
as follows. Roger reasons: “I see us interacting as student and teacher.
As a teacher, Sarah adheres to the student/teacher norm, and I know I
adhere to that norm, so I conclude that we both conform to the norm.”
Sarah reasons the same way about Roger to the conclusion that she
knows that they both conform. So we have:
Roger knows1 that they conform to the norm.
Sarah knows1 that they conform to the norm.

Roger and Sarah get to the second level reasoning about their
first level reasoning. Roger reasons: “Sarah knows that I know
students and teachers conform to the norm. So, at the first level, she
will have reasoned from my knowing that to the conclusion that I
know that we conform to the norm.” For Roger to reach that
conclusion is for him to know2 that Sarah knows1 that they conform.
Sarah reasons the same way about Roger and thus she know2 that he
knows1 that they conform. So we have:
Roger knows2 that Sarah knows1 that they conform to the norm.
Sarah knows2 that Roger knows1 they conform to the norm.

They get to the rest of the levels in the same way, by reasoning
about their reasoning at the level below. As in the eye contact
example, these attributions of reasoning do not characterize reasoning
that Roger and Sarah actually produce. They characterize a capacity
they share. That capacity makes them transparent to each other as far
as coordination under the student/teacher norm is concerned. They are
capable of ruling out any relevant possibility of doubt or deception
with regard to their conformity under the norm, so, as with eye
contact, there is nowhere to hide, either inadvertently or by design.
Their transparency is a form of trust.
C. Trust
Our equation of transparency and trust may seem wrong. After
all, isn’t it obvious that trust contrasts with knowledge? Isn’t trust a
matter of having faith that something is true when you do not know
that it is? Those points are obvious—on one traditional understanding
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of trust.110 There is, however, another tradition that contrasts trust
with the lack of a certain sort of knowledge, not with the lack of
knowledge per se. The sociologist Barbara Misztal exemplifies this
tradition when she remarks that “[t]rust always involves an element of
risk resulting from our inability to monitor others’ behaviour, from
our inability to have a complete knowledge about other people’s
motivations.”111
We align ourselves with this second tradition. Our focus is on
strangers whose only relevant knowledge of each is that they present
themselves to each other in certain social roles. There is always “an
element of risk resulting from our inability to monitor others’
behavior.” A person who appears to fulfill a certain role may not
actually adhere to the norms associated with that role.
When Roger enters Sarah’s office, she assumes that he belongs
to the group students and teachers for whom it obvious that everyone
learns that students and teachers conform to the student/teacher norm.
She could be mistaken. Perhaps it is Roger’s first week at the
university after growing up in a small town where his source of
information about higher education was his cousin, George. George
dropped out in his sophomore year and, embittered by the experience,
convinced the credulous Roger that professors secretly pooled their
information about students to use it all against them.112
To get common knowledge out of role presentations, you have to
make background assumptions about the efficacy of processes of
education and acculturation. People do routinely make those
assumptions, as their thought and action shows. The result is a vision
of others as transparent as far as coordination under norms goes. We
treat this vision as a form of trust. We define the special notion of
trust we will use as follows. You trust another person to conform to a
norm if, based on the relevant role presentations, it is common
knowledge between you that each of you will conform.113
Some may still wonder why we bother to talk about trust.
Couldn’t we just talk about knowledge based on role presentations?

See e.g., ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 21 (2000).
BARBARA MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES: THE SEARCH FOR THE BASES OF
SOCIAL ORDER 18-19 (1996) (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. There are a wide variety of treatments of trust and coordination. See, e.g, ANDREW H.
KYDD, TRUST AND MISTRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (3rd ed. 2007); KATHERINE
HAWLEY, TRUST: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 4–5 (2012); KAREN COOK, RUSSELL HARDIN
& MARGARET LEVI, COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST? (2007).
110.
111.
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We could, but we would lose something essential. We would be
overlooking the fact that our daily role-mediated dependencies on
others occur within a web of associations and evaluations, a web that
has the concept of trust at its center. Talk of trust keeps those
association and evaluations at center stage. Talk of trust underscores
the remarkable fact that people confidently predict how complete
strangers will act based solely on the fact that they present themselves
in a certain role. Role-based trust is a constant feature of daily life. As
the Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom notes,
As we go about our everyday life, we interact in a wide diversity of
complex situations. Many of us face a morning and evening
commute where we expect that others, who are traveling at great
speeds, will observe the rules of the road. Our very lives depend on
these expectations. Others depend on our own driving behavior
conforming in general to locally enforced rules about speeding,
changing lanes, and turn-taking behavior at intersections. Those of
us who work in large organizations—universities, research centers,
business firms, government offices—participate in a variety of
team efforts. In order to do our own work well, we are dependent
on others to do their work creatively, energetically, and
114
predictably, and vice versa.

Trust of strangers in the form of common-knowledge-created
transparency is a pervasive feature of daily life. The investigative
gaze undermines this trust.
It does so by undermining the common knowledge on which
trust (in our sense) depends. Role presentations serve as a basis for
common knowledge in part because they provide a basis for knowing
that others will conform to norms. As we argue it the next section, the
investigative gaze subverts the ability of role presentation to generate
the first-level knowledge that others will conform to norms. Without
first-level knowledge, there is no reasoning to replicate to yield
knowledge at higher levels. The consequence is that role-based
common knowledge disappears. The transparency of commonknowledge-based trust vanishes along with it, and people become
opaque to each other.
V. THE LOSS OF TRUST AND THE THREAT TO THE SELF
We explain how the investigative gaze undermines the capacity
of role presentations to serve as a basis for knowing that others will

114.

ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 4 (2005).
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conform, and we then consider the consequences for norm-enabled
coordination. To fully evaluate those consequences, we turn to the
threat the investigative gaze poses to the self.
A. How Surveillance Undermines Trust
An example is helpful in explaining how the investigative gaze
undermines the capacity of role presentations to serve as a basis for
knowing that others will conform. Imagine Edward, a whistleblowing
source with classified government information, contacts Glenn, a
well-known investigative journalist. Glen assumes the government
will turn its investigative gaze on his interactions with the source, and
that other investigative journalists are, and believe they are, under
surveillance. Those assumptions are correct,115 but their truth does not
matter for the purposes of the example. What matters is the effect of
journalists’ believing they are true. Specifically, is presenting yourself
as a journalist still sufficient for other journalists to know that you
would conform to the journalist norm given the power of today’s
governmental investigative gaze?
Perhaps not. The point of conforming to the norm is to ensure a
politically independent press by refusing to disclose the identity of
sources. The investigative gaze makes it extremely difficult to conceal
the identity of a source even if a journalist refuses to disclose it, so the
point of refusing to disclose disappears.
In addition, surveillance can readily give the government
evidence of a journalist’s communications with a source and of a
journalist’s receiving and concealing classified or sensitive
information. The consequences may include government harassment,
imprisonment for refusal to disclose a source, and, in national security
cases, prosecution under the Espionage Act.116
Against this background, Glen asks, “Will other journalists, most
of whom are strangers to me, conform to the journalist norm? Can I
predict based merely on their presentation of themselves as journalists
that they will conform?” How can he confidently answer yes?
Previously, a journalist’s role presentation was a reliable predictor of
conformity when refusing to disclose a source’s identity effectively
concealed the source’s identity. But it no longer is now when the
government can easily focus its gaze on activities that were formerly

115. See generally GREENWALD, supra note 90; SAGAR, supra note 91. We discuss the
issues at some length in Sloan & Warner, supra note 49.
116. See SAGAR, supra note 91, at 105, 154.
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easy to conceal. Different people will act differently. Some may
conform to express their allegiance to the ideal of a politically
independent press. Some may conform because “that is what
journalists do,” or for various other reasons. Others will not conform
on the ground that doing so has lost its point and incurs increased
risks.
For people he knows well, Glen may be able to assign some
rough probability to his prediction of what they will do, but, in the
case of strangers, Glen will not have enough information to do that.
All he will know is that different people will react differently, and he
will be unable to assign any even rough probability to whether they
will conform or not. We will describe these cases as instances of
uncertainty.117
This pattern repeats itself for other norms. In general, the main
reason for conforming to informational norms is the selective control
of the flow of information. The investigative gaze reduces, if it does
not eliminate, the point of conforming by reducing, if not eliminating,
the parties’ ability to conceal a wide range of information.118 In
addition, being under the investigative gaze carries with it
unpredictable consequences, and, in a wide range of cases, increases
the risk of unwanted consequences, both known and unknown.
Assume—for the moment—that people are aware of the reach
and power of the investigative gaze. Then, different people will react
differently, and in the case of strangers, one will not have enough
information to assign any even rough probability to whether they will
conform. One will be uncertain. It follows that, among strangers, role
presentations are no longer sufficient for people to know that others
will conform to norms. Common knowledge collapses, trust vanishes,
and people become opaque.
Grant, for the moment, that the loss of trust leads to a decline in
coordination under informational norms. That would entail a decline

117. This technical use of “uncertainty” is standard in economics. See KEN BINMORE,
RATIONAL DECISIONS 35 (2011); OSTROM, supra note 114, at 49.
118. For a similar view, see Margot Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 9
WASH. LAW REV. 1113 (2015); Margot Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect:
First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 UNIV. RICHMOND
LAW REV. 456 (2015). See also Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a
Networked World, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 129–136 (2003), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/642611.642635; Valerian J.
Derlega & Alan L. Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social Relationships, 33 J. SOC.
ISSUES 102–115 (1977); VALERIAN J. DERLEGA & ALAN L. CHAIKIN, SHARING INTIMACY:
WHAT WE REVEAL TO OTHERS AND WHY (1975).
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in privacy in public, because privacy in public arises in significant
part from coordination under informational norms. The decline in
privacy in public carries with it a decline in the ability to realize the
wide range of social roles that require a significant degree of privacy
in public. Opportunities for self-realization wane significantly, and
people lead impoverished lives compared to those they can still lead
now.
Fortunately, at present, in a wide range of cases, people continue
to coordinate under informational norms. Their coordination
facilitates the privacy in public people need to realize social roles that
depend on restricted flows of information. So our assumption that
norm-enabled coordination declines may be wrong. One may also
question our assumption that people know and understand the
investigative gaze.
Our point is that both assumptions are likely to become true in
the near future. So, the threat of a serious loss of opportunities for
self-realization, while it remains just a threat, is nonetheless an
imminent one. Even if people do not understand the reach and power
of the investigative gaze today, they are increasingly aware of
surveillance and its effects.119 So turn the clock forward to the time
when people are well aware of the investigative gaze. Once they are,
role-based-common knowledge among strangers disappears, and
strangers become opaque as the transparency of common-knowledgebased trust vanishes. Will coordination under informational norms
decline?
Perhaps but not necessarily. The loss of common knowledge
leaves people uncertain about whether others will conform, and what
people do when they are uncertain depends on how they value the
relevant outcomes.120 If they value conformity enough, they will still
conform.

119. See PEW Research Center for the People & the Press July 2013 Political Survey, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER FOR PEOPLE & THE PRESS (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacyquestionnaires/7-26-13 NSA Topline for Release.pdf (Post-Snowden, knowledge of government
surveillance is widespread. According to a 2013 PEW survey, “50% of Americans answered ‘a
lot’ to ‘How much, if anything, have you heard about the government collecting information
about telephone calls, e-mails and other online communications as part of efforts to monitor
terrorist activity?’ Another 37% answered ‘a little.’ Totaling the percentages yields 87% with
some knowledge of government surveillance and hence—possibly—some knowledge of their
own complicity.).
120. We offer a game-theoretic model in support of this claim in Sloan & Warner, supra
note 49, at 393-402; Robert H Sloan & Richard Warner, The Harm in Merely Knowing: Privacy,
Complicity, Surveillance, and the Self, 19 J. INTERNET LAW 3 (2015).
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Consider a non-norm example first. Suppose that Victor prefers
to attend the opera if Victoria attends as well, and prefers to stay
home alone if she does not. He is uncertain whether she will attend.
Whether Victor will go to the opera depends on how much he values
the options relative to each other. If he values going to the opera
highly enough, he will go even though he is uncertain whether she
will. Conformity under informational norms is the same. A person
will conform even in the glare of the investigative gaze if the person
values the consequences of conformity sufficiently more than the
consequences of non-conformity. So, if enough people value
conformity highly enough, people may continue to coordinate under
informational norms. The observable behavior will look the same as it
does when common-knowledge-based trust leads parties to
coordinate. What is going on, however, is very different. Trust allows
strangers to coordinate knowing the other will. When people are
uncertain whether others will conform, their conformity is the placing
of a bet on an outcome to which they can assign no particular
probability.
We think this is a plausible explanation of the current pattern of
conformity to informational norms in the presence of the investigative
gaze. As increasing awareness of surveillance undermines common
knowledge, people will conform as long as they place a sufficiently
high value on the coordination that results when both they and others
conform.121 “Sufficiently high” is be high enough to make conformity
a more attractive choice than non-conformity. In the journalist and
source example this corresponds to the attitude, “The conformity of
the community of journalists is so important to me that I will conform
on the chance that others will conform.”122
In either case, if such conformity to informational norms in the
presence of the modern investigative gaze persists for long enough, it
is plausible people would eventually become accustomed to
121. Some may object that many people have not thought enough about surveillance and
its consequences to be described as valuing conformity under surveillance more than nonconformity under surveillance. Surely many, if not most, people use their smart phone, post on
Facebook, and the like without thinking anything like, “Given surveillance, I still value the
outcomes of norm-conformity more than non-conformity.” Our notion of valuing, however,
extends to the cases in which one would explicitly rank conformity higher in value than nonconformity if, under suitably ideal conditions, one were to explicitly consider what one valued.
122. People will also conform if they value what they get from their own conformity (no
matter what others do) more than the outcomes that flow from non-conformity. In the journalist
and source example, this would be the attitude, “I believe so strongly in the ‘journalists don’t
disclose the identity of sources’ norm that I’m going to follow it regardless of both surveillance
and other journalists’ behavior.”
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effectively revealing a variety of different sorts of information to the
investigative gaze and accept doing so as consistent with the selective
disclosure required by various social roles. Role presentations would
again become a reliable predictor of conformity to informational
norms even in the presence of the investigative gaze, common
knowledge would return and would bring with it the transparency of
common-knowledge-based trust. The danger is that people will be too
tolerant of the investigative gaze and embrace a world in which
ubiquitous and penetrating surveillance both severely restricts
opportunities for self-realization and imposes the undesirable political
and social consequences outlined earlier.
One countermeasure is obvious: restrict the reach and power of
the investigative gaze. Privacy advocates and policy makers have
repeatedly recommended and pursued that strategy. There is,
however, a second and equally important countermeasure they have
ignored: preserve and restore role-based common knowledge.
Without it, strangers will remain opaque and opportunities for selfrealization will remain limited.
The task is more urgent than it may seem. The amount of time
available to carry out the task depends in part on how long normenabled coordination continues under conditions of uncertainty.
Under such conditions, coordinating is placing a bet on an outcome to
which one can assign no particular probability. Coordination will
continue as long as people value conformity sufficiently more than
non-conformity. The instant peoples’ values change coordination
collapses. Will people’s values change?
That is not unlikely. The investigative gaze creates a threat to the
self, and that threat may lead people to assign a large disvalue to the
consequences of conformity. If enough people assign a large enough
disvalue, people will value non-conformity over conformity, and
conformity to informational norms cease. Interaction among people
would not cease, of course. It would still be true that “[a]s we go
about our everyday life, we interact in a wide diversity of complex
situations,”123 but, without coordination under informational norms,
the character of those interactions would profoundly change. One
possibility is a world in which an
implicit bargain. . . is offered to citizens: pose no challenge and
you have nothing to worry about. Mind your own business, and
support or at least tolerate what we do, and you’ll be fine. Put

123.

OSTROM, supra note 114, at 4.
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differently, you must refrain from provoking the authority that
wields surveillance powers if you wish to be deemed free of
wrongdoing. This is a deal that invites passivity, obedience, and
conformity. The safest course, the way to ensure being “left
124
alone,” is to remain quiet, unthreatening, and compliant.

We conclude by examining the threat to the self and considering
how likely it is that it will undermine coordination under
informational norms.
B. The Threat to the Self
Othello stands as a warning of the potential threat to the self in
the “I see” of the investigative gaze. Othello’s “I’ll see” results in a
“data profile” of Desdemona that wrongly represents her as
unfaithful. Desdemona’s protestations of faithfulness are unavailing.
They would have been effective at the beginning of the play when
Desdemona’s presentation of herself as a loving spouse prompted
Othello to call her his “soul’s joy,” but Othello’s “I see” destroys his
trust in that role presentation, and, in a display of the destructive
power of the combination of loss of trust and acontextual
representations, he kills Desdemona and then himself.
The trust-undermining investigative gaze subjects people to a
similar misinterpretation through the use of acontextual data. The
ubiquity of the investigative gaze entails a loss of control over how
you appear, and the heavy reliance on acontextual data means the way
you appear to others does not accurately reflect the way you are. That
inaccurate representation nonetheless determines to a great extent the
risk and benefits that come your way. You contribute to this
misrepresentation whenever you conform to informational norms.
Conformity has always entailed selectively revealing information.
Today, however, even selectively revealing information entails
revealing that information to the ubiquitous investigative gaze.
Will people come to place a high enough disvalue on constantly
playing into their own misrepresentation that it outweighs the value
they place on conformity to informational norms? The metaphors we
considered earlier suggest they should, even if they do not.125 They

124. GREENWALD, supra note 90, at 195. We discuss possible futures in Sloan& Warner,
supra note 49, at 403-08.
125. For additional considerations, see JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2001) (emphasizing the undesirability of acontextual
characterizations of people). ONORA O’NEILL, A QUESTION OF TRUST: THE BBC REITH
LECTURES 64 (2002) (emphasizing the need to trust “with good judgment”).
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suggest that pervasive surveillance dehumanizes people. They
become “mere algorithm fodder,”126 “nodes of information
production,”127 and puppets manipulated through “invisible
threads.”128 They are “forced. . . into the undivided coherency of
statistics. . . [into] a positive absorption into the transparency of
computers, which is something worse than alienation.”129
The metaphors raise questions. Will people see the pervasive
presence of the investigative gaze as dehumanizing? Will they as a
result assign a high disvalue to exposing themselves through normenabled coordination to the distorting use of acontextual data? And
will that disvalue be great enough to outweigh the value they place on
conformity to norms?
The fact that people still routinely conform to informational
norms shows that currently the answer to the second question at least
is “No.” The answers to both questions could change to a clear “Yes,”
but it seems unlikely that the change would occur for all
informational norms.
The reason is that different consequences are associated with
conformity to different types of norms. Conforming to the journalist
norm can expose you to government harassment and prosecution.
Compare this with the student/teacher norm in an institution that uses
one of the increasingly popular student tracking programs like
Jenzabar.130 Jenzabar offers “a 360 degree view of each student—
from academic performance and extracurricular engagement to
financial aid and demographic information—providing you with deep
insights into potential risk factors and probabilities of success.”131 The
risk for a conforming students is that they will be represented (or
misrepresented) in ways inconsistent with choices they have made
about how to pursue their self-realization. The risk, while serious, is
not as grave as prosecution for failure to disclose a source or the
possession and use of classified information.

126. PASQUALE, supra note 48, at 198.
127. DEIBERT, supra note 69.
128. SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 70.
129. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 71, at 210. Alienation, a sense of separation from others,
requires a sense oneself as separate and autonomous. Peoples’ “absorption” into their digital
profiles denies them even that bittersweet solace.
130. JENZABAR, http://www.jenzabar.com (last visited April 5, 2016).
131. Jenzabar Retention, JENZABAR (2013), http://www.jenzabar.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/Jenzabar_Retention_Brochure_web_2.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
In general, the degree of disvalue people assign to conformity
under norms will vary as the severity of the risks of conformity vary,
and those risks will vary with the type of norm. The result is that the
negative effect of people’s perception of increased disvalue on
coordination spreads across a spectrum from “extreme disvalue” to
“minimal disvalue.”
The more people’s responses gravitate toward the “extreme
disvalue” end, the more norm-enabled coordination collapses. This is
more than just an abstract possibility. There are a number of examples
arguably moving toward the “extreme disvalue” end. The journalist
norm and the student/teacher norm are cases in point, as we have
argued elsewhere.132 Other examples include norms involved in hiring
and retention, health insurance, the extension of credit, direct
marketing, price discrimination, and news reporting.133
The solution is to preserve and restore role-based common
knowledge. That task has not been on the radar of either public policy
makers or privacy advocates, but it very much should be.

132.
133.

Warner and Sloan, supra note 84; Sloan and Warner, supra note 49.
See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.



















